1821 Info 11f2_1 : Walter John Thomas Blackman

Tom eventually rejoined 2/AFA on 12 September 1917. At this time 2/AFA were scattered over the Ypres area of Belgium with their Headquarters at Renninghelst, the modern Reningelst, near Poperinghe (possibly Lanbouver Farm G21.b.1.1) As it is not know which section Tom served with, it is difficult to give more than a general overview of his time in Flanders and France.

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During the month of September the following numbers of casualties were evacuated to:

With the HQ still based at Reninghelst [modern Reningelst], 22 reinforcements arrived on 3 October 1916, making a compliment of 246. Although Tom arrived in September, no reinforcements were recorded in that month. The process of 2/AFA leaving the Ypres area and handing over establishments, began on 12 September: on the 12th Bedford House to 4/AFA; on the 13th Lillegate to 5/AFA and on the 14th Brandhoek to the 5/AFA. On the 15 September HQ marched out of Reninghelst.

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The Battle of Flers-Courcelette was fought between 15-22 September 1916 as part of the Battle of the Somme. The 2/AFA arrived in the area on 30 October 1916, taking over from 87th Imperial Field Ambulance, and stayed until 14 November 1916. They took over three Sunbeam ambulance cars from 3/AFA and one Ford motor ambulance from 1/AFA. At 12.30am on 05 November 1916, with their HQ at Bernafay, the unit was involved in 1/Australian Brigade's minor operation: a night attack against Bayonet Trench some 500 yards north of Guedudecourt. At about 0130, 50 men of 2/Bn AIF reported as extra stretcher bearers and by 0400 the remaining Bearers were called out increasing the number to 271. With one Bearer killed and another wounded whilst trying to evacuated six cases from 'No Man's Land' RAP, the post was cleared after dark. The remaining RAPs were cleared on the evening of the 5th. Again there is no indication of Tom's part in the action.

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Stretcher Bearers carried the injured from the RAPs to the Bull Trench and North Flers Collecting Posts and on to East Flers and the tram line. From the Wagon Rendezvous horse drawn ambulances, on an hourly service, took the casualties to the Advanced Dressing Station. Here the casualties were assessed and sent to Bécordel-Becourt: the slight cases went to the Corps Collecting Station and the sever cases to the Corps Main Dressing Station. The ambulance frequency changed according to the state of the road, often taking six hours for seven miles, and the carriers were changed every four days as mud in the forward areas was often knee deep.

Hot drinks were served at the Collecting and Relay Posts and dressings were changed. At the Advanced Dressing Station the main dressing of wounds took place, anti-tetanus serum was given and the general comfort of the casualties address: hot coffee, tea, cocoa and milk were served, together with a full supply [of food].

Stocks of surgical, shell dressings, gauze and wool were kept at all posts, with a stock of not less than 24 blankets. One hundred stretchers were shared between the three relay posts. At the Advanced Dressing Station there were 700 blankets, 200 stretchers, 1000 emergency rations, 3000 anti-tetanus and a full stock of medical comforts.

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2/AFA remained in the Somme area. On 14 November 1916, they marched out of their Bernafay HQ arriving at Buire[-sur-Ancre] the following day. On 18 November, 2/AFA established a hospital in Grand Maison, rue de Vignacourt, La Chaussee[-Tirancourt. On the last day of the month they entrained at Vignacourt for Edgehill (Dernancourt, map reference: 62d NE1 E.20.b), before marching through Buire to Ribemont[-sur-Ancre]. From here their hospital sent casualties to CCS at Heilly or the Corps Rest Station at Buire. On 05 December 1916, 100 men were bussed to Frécourt, before marching to Buire the next day to assist in running the Corps Rest Station. From 21 December until 26 January, 1917 through one of the coldest winters on record, 2/AFA operated from 1 ANZAC Corps Rest Station at Belle View (Albert (Map reference 57d SE4 5.c.5.5)). After the snow had melted on 13 January 1917, the HQ relocated, on 26 January, to the Bottom Wood railway junction to take over the 150 bed dressing station east of Albert (Map reference Ovillers 57d SE4 X28.b and 29.a). On 9 February 1917, two days after Tom was detached, the unit HQ moved 2,200 yards due west to Bécourt Chateau (Map reference Ovillers 57d SE4 X25.d.6.6).

The date of Tom's visit to Leslie Crompton BLACKMAN's grave at Berks Extension Cemetery, Ploegsteert Wood, is unknown. The photograph shows winter snow and from his calendar it must have been the winter of 1916-1917. The War Diary of 2/AFA describes it as one of the coldest and harshest in France and Flanders' history. An agonising cold that bit early. There is no obvious date when Tom was near Ploegsteert. The table below locates Tom's units and their distance from Ploegsteert, but remains inconclusive.

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On 01 May 1917, in fine and warm weather, Tom returned to 55/Bn as one of 40 reinforcements, whilst the battalion was training at Bécourt before moving to Faurevil on 07 May 1917, when they went into the line. They returned to Faurevil camp on 26 May 1917. There is no obvious record of Tom being sent to 2/OTB based at Pembroke College, Cambridge, ¹ not Pemberton College as listed in Tom's record.

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Neither the August nor September 1917 War Diary recorded Tom Blackman’s arrival to the Battalion. His service record shows that he joined on 20 September 1917, six days before the battle. However the War Diary for September 1917 shows no officer joining the Battalion as reinforcements. ¹ Nor is it known which company Tom was attached to but it is assumed to be either ‘A’ Coy. or ‘C’ Coy. who were involved in the battle. This narrative outlines the part he and his platoon would have taken and their experiences in the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September 1917. Tom’s service record suggests he could have been in the field until 03 October 1917.

Today Polygon Wood is a large, roughly five sided, state owned wood 1.6km south of Zonnebeke, containing two Commonwealth War Grave Cemeteries: Buttes New British Cemetery and Polygon Wood Cemetery. The wood changed hands five time during the war in which time much of the original wood was destroyed. Polygon Wood is dominated by a mound called the ‘Butte’. Built by the Belgian military as a firing range before the war, it had been fortified by the Germans and was used as an observation post. At the centre of the wood, that is crossed by intersecting rides, was the oval ‘Racecourse’ used by the pre-war Belgium cavalry and gunners working their limbers. Lyn MacDonald’s 1914 says that the Belgium Olympic equestrian team trained there.

Today the wood has returned to thick undergrowth with the rides making wonderful walks. At the north-east corner and surrounded by a low wall is the green mowed grass of the cemetery dominated by the Butte and 5th Division monument.

On 21 September 55/Battalion moved to Chateau Segard in full marching order. On the night of 22/23 September, the Battalion began their move to the left of the attack line to relieve 2/Battalion of 1/Australian Division. The route was Chateau Segard, to map reference H.24 central, to Shrapnel Corner [Howitzer Spur], to the north of Zillebeke Lake, Tottenham Corner, Oxford Circus, Birr Track to Leinster Farm and Zouave Wood, the planked road to the south of Hooge before crossing the Menin Road and to map reference I.18.b.1.6. ² In part, this roughly a nine hour cross country route, missed the constantly shell targeted areas such as Hellfire Corner.

[The] battalion moved through the remains of Ypres, out through the Menin Gate and up the Menin Road towards the sound of the guns. Platoons gathered in groups and passed Hellfire Corner in short rushes to avoid the relentless German shelling. The country forward of Ypres was 'a scene of desolation and destruction', contested by the wartime protagonists for years. The Menin Road was lined with dead horses and mules, destroyed wagons and guns. In the distance the remnants of woods could be seen while the British guns, in some places almost wheel to wheel, fired on distant targets, their flashes lighting both the sky and the terrain. The road forward was crammed with men and vehicles, all making their way to the front. At Birr Crossroads near Hooge, the battalions met the guides who would lead them forward to the front. At dusk the troops arrived at the plank road and then continued to march westward towards Westhoek Ridge where they halted close to the 50th Battalion and sought shelter in shell holes. From here the men would make their final approach to the jumping-off tapes which had been laid by the battalion intelligence officer and the battalion scouts. ³

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By 8am on 24 September, 14/Brigade had relieved two battalions in Glencorse Wood, ⁴ with units holding the front line. That night 55/Battalion was relieved by the 54th and they moved to Halfway House ⁵ where it was reported ‘all men are in high spirits and eagerly awaiting a chance to get to close quarters with [the enemy]’.⁶The Battalion moved from Halfway House at 12.15am proceeding to the assembly area reaching the jump off tape at 2.30am. Excellent discipline was maintained and the Battalion moved into position without casualties. ⁷

ANZAC Camp in the Cafe Belge area with Chateau Segard in the trees - Australian War Memorial (AWM) E0138A

Chateau Segard 30 April 1916 - Imperial War Museum (IWM) Q546

Shrapnel Corner 30 October 1917 - AWM E04617

Birr Crossroads ammunition dump 17 October 1917 - AWM E01991

Australian 1st Division at Hooge 05 October 1917 - AWM E00833

Supplies going up to Hooge possibly on the 55 Bn's route - AWM H08755

Glencorse Wood 26 September 1917 - AWM E00916a

Halfway House from China Wall Road in 2009 - Photo: Matthew Dempster

Halfway House in 2009 - Photo: Matthew Dempster

Railway crossing rest camp was in the top right field behind the yellow notices 04 October 2017 - Photo: Author

Zillebeke Lake 04 October 2017 - Photo: Author

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The Battalion held the line for 48 hours before the attack and during that period the officers became thoroughly acquainted with the ground in front of them. Aerial reconnaissance and photographs showed the enemy had built their very well camouflaged east facing dugouts behind and in front of the Blue Line. A great number were incomplete or destroyed dug-outs and some little distance behind the trench in an incomplete line.

The day before the attack 53/Battalion assembled in Nonne Bosschen Wood, the frequent target of German guns. The 55th and 56th Battalion assembled five yards to the rear of the 53rd who were tasked with capturing the Red Line first objective, a distance of 750m. Once taken the 55th and 56th were to leap frog through and capture a further 350m and consolidate the Blue Line between J.4.d.30 and J.4.d.36. On the night of 25 September the Battalion followed the white tapes, in artillery formation of small single file groups at 50 yard intervals, to the taped assembly area. ⁸ The Battalion was in position by 3am with no casualties.

Each man carried their uneaten day’s rations, iron rations, socks and their canteen of water for at least 48 hours. Anti-gas goggles and their box respirator were kept handy, with their waterproof sheet in their pack. In addition they carried 120 rounds small arms ammunition (SAA), two bombs, two sandbags, field dressing, entrenching tools and a breech cover to prevent mud getting into the rifles mechanism.

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At precisely 5.50am on the morning of 26 September, Zero hour was announced by a perfect but noisy artillery barrage of smoke put down 150 yards in front of the forming up line. After resting there for three minutes, high explosive and shrapnel crept forward, to timetable, with the three attacking close formation battalions following very closely behind. Section Commanders everywhere led their sections forward in good order in worm fashion as recently trained and followed the barrage closely. All went smoothly. In moving to the first objective it was difficult to hold the men in check. Captain Cotterell of the 55th, led the advance at stroll, cigarette in mouth and map in hand. After four minutes the Battalion had ‘walked’ through the feeble enemy barrage and their shells fell behind them. An effective Australian counter barrage resulted in few casualties from incoming shells. However, immediately before the advance one or two enemy shells burst close to ‘C’ Coy. inflicting three or four casualties.

Meeting very little resistance, 53/Battalion reached the Red Line on time. In the mist and smoke, restricting visibility to 15 yards, those following lost direction, drifting slightly left. Units intermingled with one another though map and compass set the right direction. The area was thoroughly mopped up and the very few machine gun nests that remained in the first 500 yards were smothered by leading sections before they could offer resistance.

The barrage halted on the Red Line enabling 55/Battalion’s officers to re-organise for the second advance. At zero plus 100 minutes the barrage increased in intensity and crept forward at the slower rate of 100 yards in eight minutes. 55/Battalion moved forward simultaneously with 56/Battalion on its right. In the advance to the Blue Line, the manned shell holes, pill boxes and strong posts were more numerous. The men broke into eights or nines to mop up as frightened enemy were eagerly surrendered. No serious check was given until the barrage halted.

The Blue Line, clearly marked by 18 pounders smoke shells, was reached at 8.30am when the troops immediately began to dig in, reorganise and consolidate. Battalion HQ was built into the Butte using an enemy dugout at I.10.a.6.9. At 8.50am fighting patrols made contact with the flanking units dealing with enemy strong holds: on the left 20 prisoner with two machine guns surrendered immediately. One officer, one sergeant and two others attacked the strong point on the right, which resisted until, when bombed, the crew of the machine gun was put out of action and over 30 prisoners taken with their machine gun.

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At some point in the battle, Tom and four of his platoon were buried by a British fall-short. The time and location are not known. By the time the objective was reached the Battalion had only suffered about 7% casualties and the majority of wounds were slight. However, the War Diary records what may have been Tom’s burial by friendly fire with the sentence There were only three or four casualties from our own barrage. ie Tom and some of his platoon, as recorded by his Repatriation Record.

Shell destroyed woods, showing rides, the racecourse and the shadow of the Butte 14 September 1917 - Cave

German bunker outside Polygon Wood 21 September 1917 - Australian Warm Memorial (AWM) E00778

Polygon Wood on 21 September 1917 showing shelter or stronghold - AWM E00783b

The Butte post battle and site of 5th Division memorial - AWM C04778

Duckboards cross the tree stunted attack approach to the Butte - Passchendaele Museum, Zonnebeke

Dugouts in the Butte showing the original memorial c.1919 - note the dugouts in the Butte, which may have contained the Aid Post - AWM J06406

The Red Lin on the far side of the Butte with a temporary memorial c.1919 - AWM J06409

A landscaped area with the beginnings of a formal cemetery and the completed memorial

Undated postcard showing the formal New Buttes Cemetery and completed 5th Division memorial

When dug out, Tom continued to fight with his unit until the battle was over, then he collapsed. He may have been involved in the consolidation under the protection of the Australian barrage, which died down at 11.17am. The Battalion constructed a fairly formidable system of strong points and trenches, which were eventually deepened and connected by saps, ⁹ in preparation for any counter attacks. At 3.20am on the 27th, the 55th reported all quiet and satisfactory. If a counter attack was planned for dawn on the 27th the attempt was frustrated by a barrage which went down at 5am. The first counter attack followed at 4pm, when a mass of enemy was seen moving from pill box to pill box. At about 7pm however, hundreds of the enemy came across the sky-line in small groups and concentrated at several points. At 7.15pm the enemy advanced in three waves but were cut up by the Australian barrage, which came down on the advancing enemy. Those that were not cut up by shells were mowed down by Lewis Gun and rifle fire. Enemy stretcher bearers were later seen carrying a great number of dead and wounded to the rear.

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The ‘Bosche’ did not reach the 55/Battalion lines at any point and no further attempts were made. Though bothered by snipers, the Battalion continued to hold the line until the night of the 30 September/1 October when they were relieved by 20/Manchester’s of 22/Brigade. It was felt safer to be at the front than being shelled when in support at the rear. The relief was completed at 9.30pm without any casualties and proceeded to the rest camp ¹⁰ where hot food awaited all ranks.

The enemies Order of Battle (OB) was the 34th Fusiliers, the II Reserve Infantry Regiment (RIR) the 49th RIR. The 229th RIR, the 230th RIR and the 457 Infantry Regiment. Nothing is known of their status or fighting strength.

The total casualties numbered Officers wounded 7, shell shock 1; Other ranks killed 40, wounded 137 largely caused by machine-guns in the strong points, which were very active. Does this record Tom’s injury? If so it recognises the immediate severity of the situation whilst Tom was still with the Battalion?

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Perhaps half of the 64 guns of the 3/Australian Divisional Artillery, part of 5/Division Artillery Group, were responsible for supporting 14/Brigade, who also had eight mobile guns to aid consolidation of land won. Sixteen guns were in reserve. On the left were 7/Australian Field Artillery (Aus FA) and on the right 8/Aus FA some 400m behind the Assembly Line. They were responsible for the 18-pounder (range 6,500 yards) artillery barrage to be put down 150 yards in front of the infantry line at Zero. This moved forward at Zero plus 3, with subsequent timed lifts.

In the post battle analysis, the artillery shoot was described as very successful and accurate all day, especially in breaking up the counter attacks. It was reported that the majority of the woods west of the Broodseinde-Becelaere Ridge had been recently destroyed or very much thinned out by artillery fire. However, on 24 September and before the attack, two shells were reported as fall shorts.¹¹ Therefore fall shorts, usually caused by worn barrels and atmospherics, did occur and as such were responsible for Tom being buried alive as shown in his Repatriation report.

By 10am, on 26 September, the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) moved forward from Nonne Bosschen Wood, to the Butte, 400 yards behind the front line. An advanced post was made 200 yards in front in a pill box to which the stretcher bearers carried the wounded and gave first aid, preventing congestion in the RAP. The RAP is believed to have utilized one of the German dugouts on the north-east side of the Butte facing the German rear. The photograph shows newly dug Australian dug outs on the Australia side of the Butte, which may have been a safer RDA. The wounded were cleared by 10am on 27 September. Since no Field Ambulances were to go beyond the RAP, the Battalion had to augment their own stretcher-bearers with about 30 enemy medical corps prisoners taken at the Butte who were used to carry the few wounded.

In the 5/Division War Dairy, 14/Brigade’s RAPs were planned at map references J.10.a.6.8 and J.10.a.5.8 with relay posts, manned by Field Ambulance bearers, at J.9.a.4.6 and J.14.b.9.7. The walking wounded were taken by first by wagon, from the Advanced Waggon (sic) Loading Post at I.18.b.2.7 (Hooge Crater) and I.17.b.3.8 (Birr Cross Road) and by lorry or Sunbeam ambulance cars to the Advanced Dressing Station at H.27.c.2.8 in a school across the eastern moat on the Menin Road at Ypres, a distance of approximately 5500 yards. ¹² The 14/AFA recorded casualties as Officers 4 O. Ranks 106 and no delays.

Eight unnamed officers were wounded during the battle but none were sent to hospital or Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) at Remy Sidings, though one unnamed officer went to hospital or CCS on 04 October 1917 ¹³ when II ANZAC were involved in the Battle of Broodseinde.

If Tom was the recognised ‘shell shock’ case then this may plot his journey to the rear and to safety in Le Harve on 03 October and to hospital two weeks later.

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The road running to the north-west of the wood, the centre line of 55Bn's line of attack

53Bn's start line taken from the road

53Bn's start line further into the woods, showing the modern wooded growth as it may have looked in 1914

A German pill box destroyed by shell fire

Scott Post named after the commanding officer of 53Bn

New Buttes Cemetery - 53Bn's approach to the Butte

The Red Line - 55Bn's start line behind the Butte

The Red Line - 55Bn's start line taken from the road

55Bn's approach to the Blue Line

55Bn's objective, the Blue Line across the green field

The modern car park on the Red Line

The small Polygon Cemetery, containing some of the original German headstones

5th Division memorial standing on the Butte, showing the floral tributes from the centennial ceremony

The 5th Division commemorative plaque

Judging by how few casualties 55/Battalion sustained, with only seven officers wounded and none seriously, the chances of Tom surviving the attack were very high. He could have lived to have fought on in the war: to holding Villers Bretonneux until the Battalion was driven out, to fight at Mont Saint Quentin and the crossing of the St. Quinten Canal, their last action of the war. His future chances of survival and possible promotion cannot be calculated.

Without those recorded fall-shorts Tom would not have spent the next 50 years in and out of mental institutions. Like many in the Great War, the productive life of a gentleman was lost.

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¹ The August return records five 2nd Lieutenants joining the Battalion from the Cadet Battalion, similar to the one Tom attended at Cambridge. Tom is not on the August list.
² See map numbers 1, 2, 3,6, 7 and 9. The other names can’t be traced
³ Passlow p.100
⁴ Map reference J.14.a&d – see map 10
⁵ Map reference I.16.d – see map 11
⁶ This text refers to hand written information, usually in the first few pages of the War Diary.
⁷ Text in Courier New are extracted from the War Diary typed orders and reports.
⁸Though the War Diary refers to the assembly area being in Appendix A there is no indication as to where this was. It is assumed to be at the green start line, behind the 53/Battalion.
⁹ See map above
¹⁰ Situated at H.22.c.9.1 - see map id 13 on the second map
¹¹ See map Advanced Dressing Station
¹² 55th Battalion War Diary, October 1917
¹³ Map reference J.9.b.6.3 - see map with explosion

No.2 Office Training Battalion

The Army Council created Officer Training Battalions (OTB) in December 1916. They were organised like an army battalion: four companies of four platoons commanded by an instructor. Originally, cadets were in training for four months, but this was latter extended to six months. They were formed as a mini-Sandhurst with training being in military skills and behaviour: a pre-commission course.

In 1915 and 1916, especially after Loos, the pool of school OTC temporary gentlemen and those recommended for a commission by the Head or the Commanding Officer had dried up due to the high casualty rate and the expanding army. There was concern about the efficiency of those remaining. Some were asked to resign, others were shunted into safe jobs and one was sacked.

Twenty-four infantry OTBs were created with numbers 1 to 11 being established by March 1916 in country houses or Oxbridge Colleges: 2/OTB and 5/OTB were in Cambridge Colleges. The Inns of Court 14/OTB was established in September/October 1916 from those not passing through their particular system. Brigadier James calculated there were 73,000 commissioned from OTB with a probable total of 145,621 from the total of 54 all-services OTBs.

Potential officers underwent 540 hours of training, which comprised of:

PE to improve physical fitness;
Bayonet practice to encourage aggressive attacking in the last 20 yards as the platoon closed with the enemy trench;
Drill in order to train a platoon and give command;
Musketry in the first two months, involved the theory and practice of aiming;
Field skills – bombing, gas, map work, military law and administration;
Tactical skills in the last two months – practical exercises as a platoon with the trainees taking the role of platoon commander and NCOs in rotation;
Combat appreciation – how to respond to a machine gun enfilading from the right;
Social skills in both the formal and informal mess, mess dinners necessitated which knife and fork to use as candidates may not have been experienced.

The original temporary gentlemen were educated in public school OTCs, public schools or grammar schools. When the system expanded rankers, recommended by commanding officers were sent for commission. These were largely middle class, in white collared jobs such as clerks, who were not educated to the same extent. However, they may have had two or three years experience in the trenches.

The instructor were largely officers on light duties and recovering from wounds. Some were highly decorated. One third of the instructors at 2/OTB Pembroke College were Cambridge OTC instructors commanded by CO of the Cambridge OTC.

The impact of the scheme was to create a more effective junior officer. There were few inefficient officers and only one in ten failed the system. The majority had been through the trenches and through battle.

Cadets may have been pushed through the system in a production line, but in 1917 and 1918, the BEF needed its replacement junior officers.

Source: Officer Cadet Battalions, Charles Fair, Western Front Association podcast (Accessed: 29 April 2021)

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The Battle of Polygon Wood

Polygon Wood was a battle that merited the 5 Division’s memorial. It was however a battle in two parts. The right wing, bordering the British battalions, was hard fought against German counter attacks that drove back the British and necessitated the Australians building defensive flanks. The lost ground was recovered only with hard fighting. On the left flank, the battle was straight forward and relatively ‘easy’ against Germans defensive tactics that could not blunt the growing material superiority of the BEF. p.ix

German defensive tactics

Inside the wooded area, aerial photographs showed few signs of organised defence, with just a single line of holes and a lone trench visible. Along the southern edge of the wood was a well-constructed trench running east-west, while a strongpoint was visible in the south-west corner of the woods. Several concrete structures were also identified in the 'racecourse' — the objectives of 14 Brigade. p.33

To conserve manpower, the German’s adopted the tactic of thinly held front-line. Whenever the British bombard German front-line positions the bulk of the defending infantry were to be withdrawn to safer positions in the main line of resistance. German artillery was registered on these advanced posts so when a British attack commenced, the German guns were fired a barrage to immediately disperse any British assault. The front-line defenders were scattered in shell-hole positions rather than continuous lines of trenches connected, where practical, by 'crawl trenches' or tunnels. Close behind these forward shell-hole positions were strongpoints to hold machine-guns, assault troops and support troops. In many instances these strongpoints were concrete structures, constructed using pre-cast concrete blocks or built on site, and scattered throughout the German defensive zone. p.33

The Australian Artillery plan for the Battle of Polygon Wood

In all, I Anzac Corps employed 216 field guns to support and protect the infantry. In addition, each of the attacking divisions could also utilise I Anzac Corps’ heavy and medium batteries. The heavy artillery consisted 208 guns […] including the 9.2-inch guns of the 54th Australian Siege Battery. p.63

Daily fire tasks included wire-cutting, destruction of strongpoints, harassing fire on communications and counter battery shoots to isolate guns and prevent the movement of ammunition and supplies. […] The creeping barrage began 150 yards ahead of the infantry, advanced at a rate of 100 yards every three minutes and comprised four lines of artillery fire. Closest to the advancing troops, the fire was provided by 18-pounders firing a mix of shrapnel and explosive shells. Some 200 yards further ahead was another barrage line comprising a mix of 18-pounder and 4.5-inch howitzers. A further barrage line was fired another 200 yards ahead, this time consisting of 6-inch howitzers. Finally, a further 200 yards ahead again, was a barrage line fired by 8-inch howitzers, 9.2-inch howitzers and 60-pounder guns. […] To signal the infantry that the advance was about to restart and move forward from the first objective to the second objective, the barrage would quicken from one round per minute to four rounds per minute for four minutes to allow the troops time to close up on the barrage before it began to advance again. p.63

The Australian Battle Plan

By 23 September 1917 the 4th and 5th Australian divisions had relieved the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions and preparations were under way for the next attack. Each of the divisions would attack with two brigades, with each brigade attacking its first objective (Red Line) with one battalion and the second objective (Blue Line) with two. The more difficult task was the attack on the main ridge line and this was given to the 5th Australian Division which was fresh after four month’s rest. […] Major General Hobbs, commanding the 5th Australian Division, opted to attack with the 14th and 15th brigades, leaving the 8th Brigade in reserve. p.86

[…] In the 14th Australian Brigade, the 53rd Battalion would seize the Red Line while the 55th and 56th battalions assaulted towards the second objective. Finally, in the 15th Brigade, the 60th Battalion would take the Red Line and the 57th and 59th battalions would capture the Blue Line. Each attacking battalion was allocated two Stokes mortars from the brigade light trench mortar battery to support the attack, in addition to the battalion's own weapons. p.87

Brigadier General Hobkirk, commander of the 14th Brigade, decided that his attacking battalions would each spend time in the front line to familiarise themselves with the ground, while the 15th Brigade opted to hold the front line with their reserve battalions and send forward officers and NCOs from their attacking battalions to reconnoitre the ground over which they would advance. p.87

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The Fifth Division

The 5th Australian Division moved up from behind the lines to assemble for the attack, although the fighting on 25 September 1917 had complicated the 15th Brigade's task. The 14th Brigade had moved into the front line on the night of 22/23 September, initially occupying the entire 5th Division frontage until the 15th Brigade moved forward the following night to take over its sector of the front. Private Allen Clements of the 54th Battalion (14 Brigade, 5 Division) wrote:

... Came along the road today. Dead horses, mules and men lying everywhere, burning motor lorries all over the place. Tanks coming up the road in dozens for the hop-over in the morning. The stench of dead bodies is awful. This is truly a terrible place. The Somme was only a flea-bite in comparison with it. The famous Messines Ridge rises in front of us. Our objective is a hill on the further side of it, and to the right of Polygon Wood. p.108

The 54th Battalion established its headquarters in a former German pillbox in Glencorse Wood, around 1,250 yards behind the front line. That night a heavy German barrage landed on what remained of the wood. Chaplain J.J. Kennedy of the 53rd Battalion described the bombardment:

We arrived at the sunken road where the pill-box, our destination, was situated. Again we found damnable congestion. The 54th Battalion Headquarters were in occupation, so we had to share the place with them ... We had barely settled into our new positions when the most violent bombardment I have ever experienced commenced. A heavy shell got a direct hit on our pill-box. The explosion killed a signal sergeant who was engaged with the buzzer near a window. Two others out in the trench at the time were killed. All of us inside were thrown violently to the ground, so we thought 'twas the end of things.

Further adjustments to the brigade frontage were effected when the brigade took over 100 yards of the front line occupied by the 4th Brigade on the left. During the evenings prior to the attack, patrols from the 14th Brigade went out into no man's land and managed to push as far forward as the Butte, visible ahead in the remains of Polygon Wood. On the evening of 24 September, the jumping-off line for the attack was staked out and, at dusk on 25 September, the tapes marking the jumping-off lines were laid. Each company in the assaulting battalions was allocated a rectangle in which to assemble prior to the attack. Tapes were also laid back to the Glencorse Track to enable the troops to find their way forward. Once the troops were assembled, the tapes were rolled up to avoid detection by the enemy. As a precaution, the 14th Brigade had decided to compress all 12 waves of the attacking battalions in the assembly area so that they occupied a depth of just 60 yards. At 4.00 am German artillery began to fall on the area just behind where the 14th Brigade was assembled, although it inflicted no casualties. A small covering force from the 54th Battalion occupied a line of shell holes forward of the assembly area to ensure that the enemy did not interfere with preparations for the assault. Once the leading battalion, the 53rd Battalion, was in place, the 54th Battalion moved into the brigade reserve behind the attacking troops, although many of the men in the covering force joined the assault following behind the 53rd Battalion as it advanced. At 5.22 am the 14th Brigade reported 'all correct' to 5th Division Headquarters. p.108

At zero hour the British barrage descended and the attacking battalions rose and closed to within 60 yards of the barrage. After the battle the troops praised the barrage as one of the best that had ever protected Australian troops going into battle. The dry ground combined with the smoke from the shell bursts to create a wall which rolled ahead of the troops 'like a Gippsland bushfire'. However, it was difficult for the leading troops to discern the edge of the barrage and they had to take care not to advance into the barrage itself. The wall of dust and smoke combined with a thick morning mist, reducing visibility to just 15 yards, which also made maintaining direction difficult without the use of a compass. The troops of the 53rd Battalion shook out into their formation and then knelt, waiting for the barrage to begin its advance. p.108

As they had been trained, the leading sections advanced in single file, preceded by scouts. Resistance from enemy strongpoints and pillboxes was encountered almost immediately the barrage began to move forward. As soon as they were identified, German positions were targeted by Lewis gun or rifle fire while parties worked around the flanks to clear them out using bayonets or grenades. On reaching the Butte, which lay in the 14th Brigade's sector, two platoons previously detailed for the task rushed the position. The Australians established themselves on top of the Butte after a short fight and then placed sentries on all the entrances leading into the

1821info11f2_1, sheet 24

feature. Several bombing parties then began to work their way inside. The Germans trapped inside the Butte resisted and the bombing parties were greeted with grenade and rifle fire. While most of the Germans surrendered, on several occasions the Australians were forced to use grenades to 'encourage' the German defenders to lay down their arms. The attacking platoons captured two officers and 56 other ranks during the fighting for the Butte. Shortly after the feature had been cleared, the Germans launched an immediate counter-attack to retake the position which the 53rd Battalion easily repulsed with Lewis gun and machine-gun fire, capturing a further 20 prisoners including another German officer. By 6.25 am the 53rd Battalion had reached the Red Line where it began to consolidate its position under the protection of the barrage. p.110

The 53rd Battalion positioned several Lewis guns on top of the Butte which offered excellent command of the surrounding area. Parties from the 14th Brigade Machine Gun Company also installed themselves on the Butte and 'rendered invaluable service in assisting to beat off all threatened counter-attacks'. Battalion headquarters was established in the German dugouts in the Butte itself and one and a half companies of the 53rd Battalion used the feature as cover while serving as the battalion reserve. As they were consolidating their position, they were subjected to heavy fire from German machine- guns and snipers forward of the Australian position. Enemy aircraft were also observed flying low over the British front line. The 53rd Battalion despatched several patrols which successfully dealt with snipers frustrating efforts to consolidate their position. Two aid posts were also established at the Butte and, once the available stretcher- bearers had been exhausted, casualties were collected to await evacuation. This lasted until the following morning when the 53rd Battalion's Regimental Medical Officer moved up to battalion headquarters with a further 20 stretcher-bearer parties to finalise the evacuation of the wounded. p.110

By 8.50 am contact had been established with flanking units and, under the protection of the barrage, consolidation proceeded rapidly. By 11.17 am the 14th Brigade reported that it had established 'a formidable system of trenches' and was ready for the expected German counter-attack. Both the 55th and 56th battalions had reorganised after capturing their objectives and, by mid-morning, were holding the front line with two companies each, a further company in support and another in reserve. The 56th Battalion established its headquarters at the Butte while 55th Battalion Headquarters planned to move to the Butte later in the day. Forward Observation Officers had also moved forward and adjusted the SOS barrage line to within around 200 yards of the Blue Line in anticipation of German counter-attacks. p.113

At around 4.00 pm the 14th Brigade observed German troops massing for a possible counter- attack, moving from pillbox to pillbox. However, no counter-attack materialised on the 14th Brigade's area of the front. At 7.00 pm the enemy was seen to be massing again and several hundred German troops were observed crossing the skyline in small groups. At 7.15 pm the Germans advanced in attack formations and three waves were seen approaching the British line. British guns responded quickly and those enemy troops not caught by the artillery were targeted by Lewis guns and machine-guns from the Australian lines. The 14th Brigade reported that no enemy troops reached its front line at any point. No further enemy counter-attacks were launched against the 14th Brigade and, as evening fell, the German artillery fire abated. Patrols moved forward into no man's land and wiring parties began constructing lines of wire obstacles forward of the front line. By morning on 27 September the whole of the 14th Brigade front line was covered by a double line of French wire while almost all of the support line was shielded by a single apron line of wire. p.113

Source:
Passlow, Jonathan, The Battle of Polygon Wood 1917, Australian Army Campaign Series – 19, Army History Unit, 2018

					Ambulances
Location	Map 28NW4	Officers	OR	Wheeled litters	Horse	Car	Motor
Krusatraat Collecting Post	H24.a.6.8		5	1	2
Lillegate Collecting Post	I14.a.9.4		13		2	2
Railway Dugout ADS	I21.d.6.7	2	20	2
Railway Cutting RAP	I29.c.3.4		4	1
Sunken Road RAP	I28.d.4.4		4	1
Bedford House ADS	I26.a.8.2	2	28	2			1
Bluff RAP	I33.a.9.5.0.5		8
Branhoek Main Dressing St -	G12.b.8.5	C Section				5

Date	Unit	Location	Distance from Ploegsteert in km	Weather
01/11/16	2/AFA	Flers	110
01/11/16	2/AFA	Buire-sur-le-Ancre	133
01/12/16	2/AFA	Belle View, Albert	114
01/11/17	2/AFA	Belle View, Albert	114	Snow
01/02/17	2/AFA	Bottom Wood, Albert	114
01/02/17	5/Div	Bernafay Wood, Longueval	104
01/03/17	5/Div	Bernafay Wood, Longueval	104
28/03/17	5/Div	Beaulen Court, south of Bapaume	95
01/04/17	5/Div	Beaulen Court, south of Bapaume	95
22/04/17	55/Bn	The Dingle, north of Fricourt	128	Cold and sunny
01/05/17	55/Bn	Bécourt	114

1821 Info 11f2-1 for Walter John Thomas Blackman (Tom) At War - Flanders and France